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Abstract
Despite instructions to ignore the irrelevant word in the Stroop task, it robustly influences the time it takes to identify the 
color, leading to performance decrements (interference) or enhancements (facilitation). The present review addresses two 
questions: (1) What levels of processing contribute to Stroop effects; and (2) Where does attentional selection occur? The 
methods that are used in the Stroop literature to measure the candidate varieties of interference and facilitation are critically 
evaluated and the processing levels that contribute to Stroop effects are discussed. It is concluded that the literature does 
not provide clear evidence for a distinction between conflicting and facilitating representations at phonological, semantic 
and response levels (together referred to as informational conflict), because the methods do not currently permit their iso-
lated measurement. In contrast, it is argued that the evidence for task conflict as being distinct from informational conflict 
is strong and, thus, that there are at least two loci of attentional selection in the Stroop task. Evidence suggests that task 
conflict occurs earlier, has a different developmental trajectory and is independently controlled which supports the notion of 
a separate mechanism of attentional selection. The modifying effects of response modes and evidence for Stroop effects at 
the level of response execution are also discussed. It is argued that multiple studies claiming to have distinguished response 
and semantic conflict have not done so unambiguously and that models of Stroop task performance need to be modified to 
more effectively account for the loci of Stroop effects.
Introduction
In his doctoral dissertation, John R. Stroop was interested 
in the extent to which difficulties that accompany learning, 
such as interference, can be reduced by practice (Stroop, 
1935). For this purpose, he construed a particular type of 
stimulus. Stroop displayed words in a color that was different 
from the one that they actually designated (e.g., the word red 
in blue font). After he failed to observe any interference from 
the colors on the time it took to read the words (Exp.1), he 
asked his participants to identify their font color. Because 
the meaning of these words (e.g., red) interfered with the 
to-be-named target color (e.g., blue), Stroop observed that 
naming aloud the color of these words takes longer than 
naming aloud the color of small squares included in his con-
trol condition (Exp.2). In line with both his expectations 
and other learning experiments carried out at the time, this 
interference decreased substantially over the course of prac-
tice. However, daily practice did not eliminate it completely 
(Exp.3). During the next thirty years, this result and more 
generally this paradigm received only modest interest  from 
the scientific community (see, e.g., Jensen & Rohwer, 1966, 
MacLeod, 1992 for discussions). Things changed dramati-
cally when color-word stimuli, ingeniously construed by 
Stroop, became a prime paradigm to study attention, and in 
particular selective attention (Klein, 1964).
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The ability to selectively attend to and process only certain 
features in the environment while ignoring others is crucial 
in many everyday activities (e.g., Jackson & Balota, 2013). 
Indeed, it is this very ability that allows us to drive without 
being distracted by beautiful surroundings or to quickly find 
a friend in a hallway full of people. It is clear then that an 
ability to reduce the impact of potentially interfering infor-
mation by selectively attending to the parts of the world that 
are consistent with our goals, is essential to functioning in 
the world as a purposive individual. The Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935), as this paradigm is now known, is a selective attention 
task in that it requires participants to focus on one dimension 
of the stimulus whilst ignoring another dimension of the very 
same stimulus. When the word dimension is not successfully 
ignored, it elicits interference: Naming aloud the color that a 
word is printed in takes longer when the word denotes a dif-
ferent color (incongruent trials, e.g., the word red displayed in 
color-incongruent blue font) compared to a baseline condition. 
This difference in color-naming times is often referred to as the 
Stroop interference effect or the Stroop effect (see the section 
‘Definitional issues’ for further development and clarifications 
of these terms).
Evidencing its utility, the Stroop task has been widely used 
in clinical settings as an aid to assess disorders related to fron-
tal lobe and executive attention impairments (e.g., in attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, Barkley, 1997; schizophrenia, 
Henik & Salo, 2004; dementia, Spieler et al., 1996; and anxi-
ety, Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; see MacLeod, 1991 for an 
in-depth review of the Stroop task). The Stroop task is also 
ubiquitously used in basic and applied research—as indicated 
by the fact that the original paper (Stroop, 1935) is one of the 
most cited in the history of psychology and cognitive science 
(e.g., Gazzaniga et al., 2013; MacLeod, 1992). It is, however, 
important to understand that the Stroop task as it is currently 
employed in neuropsychological practice (e.g., Strauss et al., 
2007), its implementations in most basic and applied research 
(see here below), and leading accounts of the effect it pro-
duces, are profoundly rooted in the idea that the Stroop effect 
is a unitary phenomenon in that it is caused by the failure of 
a single mechanism (i.e., it has a single locus). By addressing 
the critical issue of whether there is a single locus or multiple 
loci of Stroop effects, the present review not only addresses 
several pending issues of theoretical and empirical importance, 
but also critically evaluates these current practices.
The where vs. the when and the 
how of attentional control
The Stroop effect has been described as the gold standard 
measure of selective attention (MacLeod, 1992) in which a 
smaller Stroop interference effect is an indication of greater 
attentional selectivity. However, the notion that it is selective 
attention that is the cognitive mechanism enabling success-
ful performance in the Stroop task has recently been side-
lined (see Algom & Chajut, 2019, for a discussion of this 
issue). For example, in a recent description of the Stroop 
task, Braem et al. (2019) noted that the size of the Stroop 
congruency effect is “indicative of the signal strength of 
the irrelevant dimension relative to the relevant dimen-
sion, as well as of the level of cognitive control applied” 
(p769). Cognitive control is a broader concept than selec-
tive attention in that it refers to the entirety of mechanisms 
used to control thought and behavior to ensure goal-oriented 
behavior (e.g., task switching, response inhibition, working 
memory). Its invocation in describing the Stroop task has 
proven to be somewhat controversial given that it implies the 
operation of top-down mechanisms, which might or might 
not be necessary to explain certain experimental findings 
(Algom & Chajut, 2019; Braem et al., 2019; Schmidt, 2018). 
It does, however, have the benefit of hypothesizing a form 
of attentional control that is not a static, invariant process 
but instead posits a more dynamic, adaptive form of atten-
tional control, and provides foundational hypotheses about 
how and when attentional control might happen. However, 
the present work addresses that which the cognitive control 
approach tends to eschew (see Algom & Chajut, 2019): the 
question of where the conflict that causes the interference 
comes from. Importantly, the answer to the where question 
will have implication for the how and when questions.
The question of where the interference derives has his-
torically been referred to as the locus of the Stroop effect 
(e.g., Dyer, 1973; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1998, Luo, 1999; 
Scheibe et al., 1967; Seymour, 1977; Wheeler, 1977; see 
also MacLeod, 1991, and Parris, Augustinova & Ferrand, 
2019). Whilst, by virtue of our interest in where attentional 
selection occurs, we review evidence for the early or late 
selection of information in the color-word Stroop task, 
recent models of selective attention have shown that whether 
selection is early or late is a function of either the attentional 
resources available to process the irrelevant stimulus (Lavie, 
1995) or the strength of the perceptual representation of the 
irrelevant dimension (Tsal & Benoni, 2010). Moreover, 
despite being referred to as the gold standard attentional 
measure and as one of the most robust findings in the field of 
psychology (MacLeod, 1992), it is clear that Stroop effects 
can be substantially reduced or eliminated by making what 
appear to be small changes to the task. For example, Besner, 
Stolz, and Boutillier (1997) showed that the Stroop effect 
can be reduced and even eliminated by coloring a single 
letter instead of all letters of the irrelevant word (although 
notably they used button press responses which produced 
smaller Stroop effects (Sharma & McKenna, 1998) making 
it easier to eliminate interference; see also Parris, Sharma, 
& Weekes, 2007). In addition, Melara and Mounts (1993) 
showed that by making the irrelevant words smaller to 
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equate the discriminability of word and color, the Stroop 
effect can be eliminated and even reversed.
Later, Dishon-Berkovits and Algom (2000) noted that 
often in the Stroop task the dimensions are correlated in that 
one dimension can be used to predict the other (i.e., when 
an experimenter matches the number of congruent (e.g., the 
word red presented in the color red) and incongruent trials 
in the Stroop task, the irrelevant word is more often pre-
sented in its matching color than in any other color which 
sets up a response contingency). They demonstrated that 
when this dimensional correlation was removed the Stroop 
effect was substantially reduced. By showing that the Stroop 
effect is malleable through the modulation of dimensional 
uncertainty (degree of correlation of the dimensional values 
and how expected the co-occurrences are) or dimensional 
imbalance (of the salience of each dimension) their data, and 
resulting model (Melara & Algom, 2003; see also Algom 
& Fitousi, 2016), indicate that selective attention is failing 
because the experimental set-up of the Stroop task provides 
a context with little or no perceptual load / little or no per-
ceptual competition, and where the dimensions (word and 
color) are often correlated and / or asymmetrical in discrimi-
nability that contributes to the robust nature of the Stroop 
effect. In other words, the Stroop task sets selective atten-
tion mechanisms up to fail, pitching as it does the intention 
to ignore irrelevant information against the tendency and 
resources to process conspicuous and correlated character-
istics of the environment (Melara & Algom, 2003). But, in 
the same way that neuropsychological impairments teach 
us something about how the mind works (Shallice, 1988), 
it is these failures that give us an opportunity to explore 
the architecture of the mechanisms of selective attention in 
healthy and impaired populations. We, therefore, ask the 
question: if control does fail, where (at what levels of pro-
cessing) is conflict experienced in the color-word Stroop 
task?
Given our focus on the varieties of conflict (and facilita-
tion), the where of control, we will not concern ourselves 
with the how and the when of control. Manipulations and 
models of the Stroop task that are not designed to under-
stand the types of conflict and facilitation that contribute to 
Stroop effects such as list-wise versus item-specific congru-
ency proportion manipulations (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Bugg, & Crump, 2012; Gonthier et al., 2016; Logan & Zbro-
doff, 1979; Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Notebaert, & 
Van Den Bussche, 2015; see Schmidt, 2019, for a review) or 
memory load manipulations (e.g., De Fockert, 2013; Kalan-
throff et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2005; Kim, Min, Kim & Won, 
2006), will be eschewed, unless these manipulations are spe-
cifically modified in a way that permits the understanding of 
the processing involved in producing Stroop interference and 
facilitation. To reiterate the aims of the present review, here 
we are less concerned with the evaluative function of control 
which judges when and how control operates (Chuderski & 
Smolen, 2016), but are instead concerned with the regula-
tive function of control and specifically at which processing 
levels this might occur. In short, the present review attempts 
to identify whether at any level, other than the historically 
favoured level of response output, processing reliably leads 
to conflict (or facilitation) between activated representa-
tions. Before we address this question, however, we must 
first address the terminology used here and, in the literature, 
to describe different types of Stroop effects.
Definitional issues to consider before we 
begin
A word about baselines and descriptions of Stroop 
effects
Given the number of studies that have employed the Stroop 
task since its inception in 1935, it is no surprise that a vari-
ety of modifications of the original task have been employed, 
including the introduction of new trial types (as exemplified 
by Klein, 1964) and new ways of responding, to measure 
and understand mechanisms of selective attention. This has 
led to disagreement over what is being measured by each 
manipulation, obfuscating the path to theoretical enlight-
enment. Various trial types have been used to distinguish 
types of conflict and facilitation in the color-word Stroop 
task (see Fig. 1), although with less fervor for facilitation 
varieties, resulting in a lack of agreement about how one 
should go about indexing response conflict, semantic con-
flict, and other forms of conflict and facilitation. Indeed, as 
can be seen in Fig. 1, one person’s semantic conflict can be 
another person’s facilitation; a problem that arises due to the 
selection of the baseline control condition. Differences in 
performance between a critical trial and a control trial might 
be attributed to a specific variable but this method relies on 
having a suitable baseline that differs only in the specific 
component under test (Jonides & Mack, 1984).
Selecting an appropriate baseline, and indeed an appro-
priate critical trial, to measure the specific component under 
test is non-trivial. For example, congruent trials, first intro-
duced by Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr (1966, Exp. 2), have 
become a popular baseline condition against which to com-
pare performance on incongruent trials. Congruent trials are 
commonly responded to much faster than incongruent trials 
and the difference in reaction time between the two condi-
tions has been variously referred to as the Stroop congru-
ency effect (e.g., Egner et al., 2010), the Stroop interference 
effect (e.g., Leung et al., 2000), and the Total Stroop Effect 
(Brown et al., 1998), and Color-Word Impact (Kahneman & 
Chajczyk, 1983). However, when compared to non-color-
word neutral trials, congruent trials are often reported to be 
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responded to faster, evidencing a facilitation effect of the 
irrelevant word on the task of color naming (Dalrymple-
Alford, 1972; Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966). Referring 
to the difference between incongruent and congruent trials as 
Stroop interference then—as is often the case in the Stroop 
literature—fails to recognize the role of facilitation observed 
on congruent trials and epitomizes a wider problem. As 
already emphasized by MacLeod (1991), this difference 
corresponds to “(…) the sum of facilitation and interfer-
ence, each in unknown amounts” (MacLeod, 1991, p.168). 
Moreover, as will be discussed in detail later, congruent trial 
reaction times have been shown to be influenced by a newly 
discovered form of conflict, known as task conflict (Goldfarb 
& Henik, 2007) and are not, therefore, straightforwardly a 
measure of facilitation either.
Furthermore, whilst the common implementation of the 
Stroop task involves incongruent, congruent, and non-color-
word neutral trials (or perhaps where the non-color-word 
neutral baseline is replaced by repeated letter strings e.g., 
xxxx), this common format ignores the possibility that the 
difference between incongruent and neutral trials involves 
multiple processes (e.g., semantic and response level con-
flict). As Klein (1964) showed the irrelevant word in the 
Stroop task can refer to concepts semantically associated 
with a color (e.g., sky; Klein, 1964), potentially permitting 
a way to answer to the question of whether selection occurs 
early at the level of semantics, before response selection, in 
the processing stream. But it is unclear whether such trials 
are direct measures of semantic conflict or indirect measures 
of response conflict.
Here, we employ the following terms: We refer to the 
difference between incongruent and congruent conditions 
as the Stroop congruency effect, because it contrasts per-
formance in conditions with opposite congruency values. 
For the reasons noted above, the term Stroop interference 
or just interference is preferentially reserved for referring to 
slower performance on one trial type compared to another. 
The word conflict will denote competing representations at 
any particular level that could be the cause of interference 
(note that interference might not result from conflict (De 
Houwer, 2003) as, for example, in the emotional Stroop task, 
interference could result without conflict from competing 
representations (Algom et al., 2004)). When the distinction 
is not critical, the terms interference and conflict will be 
used interchangeably. The term Stroop facilitation or just 
facilitation will refer to the speeding up of performance on 
one trial type compared to another (unless specified other-
wise). In common with the literature, facilitation will also 
be used to refer to the opposite of conflict; that is, it will 
denote facilitating representations at any level. Finally, the 
Fig. 1  This figure shows examples of the various trial types that have 
been used to decompose the Stroop effect into various types of con-
flict (interference) and facilitation. This has resulted in a lack of clar-
ity about what components are being measured. Indeed, as can be 
seen, one person’s semantic conflict can be another person’s facilita-




term Stroop effect(s) will be employed to refer more gener-
ally to all of these effects.
Levels of conflict vs. levels of selection
When considering the standard incongruent Stroop trial 
(e.g., red in blue) where the word dimension is a color word 
(e.g., red) that is incongruent with the target color dimension 
that is being named, and where the color red is also a poten-
tial response, one might surmise numerous levels of rep-
resentation where these two concepts might compete. Pro-
cessing of the color dimension of a Stroop stimulus to name 
the color would, on a simple analysis, require initial visual 
processing, followed by activation of the relevant semantic 
representation and then word-form (phonetic) encoding of 
the color name in preparation for a response. For this process 
to advance unimpeded until response there would need to 
be no competing representations activated at any of those 
stages. Like color naming, the processes of word reading 
also requires visual processing but of letters and not of colors 
perhaps avoiding creating conflict at this level, although 
there is evidence for a competition for resources at the level 
of visual processing under some conditions (Kahneman & 
Chajczyk, 1983). Word reading also requires the computa-
tion of phonology from orthography which color processing 
does not. One way interference might occur at this level is if 
semantic processing or word-form encoding during the pro-
cessing of the color dimension also leads to the unnecessary 
(for the purposes of providing a correct response) activation 
of the orthographic representation of the color name—as 
far as we are aware there is no evidence for this. However, 
orthography does appear to lead to conflict through a dif-
ferent route—the presence of a word or word-like stimulus 
appears to activate the full mental machinery used to process 
words. This unintentionally activated word reading task set, 
conflicts with the intentionally activated color identification 
task set, creating task conflict. Task conflict occurs whenever 
an orthographically plausible letter string is presented (e.g., 
the word table leads to interference, as does the non-word 
but pronounceable letter string fanit; the letter string xxxxx 
less so; Levin & Tzelgov, 2016; Monsell et al., 2001).
Despite being a task in which participants do not intend to 
engage, irrelevant word processing would also likely involve 
the activation of a phonological representation of the word 
and the activation of a semantic representation (and likely 
some word-form encoding), either of which could lead to 
the activation of representations competing for selection. 
However,  just because the word is processed at certain level 
(e.g., orthography or phonology here) does not mean that 
each of these levels independently lead to conflict. Pho-
nological information would only independently contrib-
ute to conflict if the process of color naming activated a 
competing representation at the same level. Otherwise, the 
phonological representation of the irrelevant word might 
simply facilitate activation of the semantic representation 
of the irrelevant word thereby providing competition for 
the semantic representation of the relevant color. In which 
case, whilst phonological information would contribute to 
Stroop effects, no selection mechanism would be required 
at the phonological level. And of course, there could be 
conflict at the phonological processing level, but with no 
selection mechanism available, conflict would have to be 
resolved later. To identify whether selection occurs at the 
level of phonological processing, a method would be needed 
to isolate phonological information from information at the 
semantic and response levels.
So-called late selection accounts would argue that any 
activated representations at these levels would result in 
increased activation at the response level where selection 
would occur with no competition or selection at earlier 
stages (e.g., Dyer, 1973; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1998, Luo, 
1999; Scheibe et al., 1967; Seymour, 1977; Wheeler, 1977; 
see also MacLeod, 1991, and Parris, Augustinova & Fer-
rand, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; for discussions of this topic). 
In contrast, so-called early selection accounts (De Houwer, 
2003; Scheibe et al., 1967; Seymour, 1977; Stirling, 1979; 
Zhang & Kornblum, 1998; Zhang et al., 1999) argue for 
earlier and multiple sites of attentional selection with Hock 
and Egeth (1970) even arguing that the perceptual encoding 
of the color dimension is slowed by the irrelevant word, 
although this has been shown to be a problematic interpreta-
tion of their results (Dyer, 1973). In Zhang and colleagues 
models, attentional selection occurred and was resolved at 
the stimulus identification stage, before any information was 
passed on to the response level which had its own selection 
mechanism.
The organization of the review
It is important to emphasize at this point then that when 
considering the locus or loci of the Stroop effect, there are 
in fact two issues to address. The first concerns the level(s) 
of processing that significantly contribute to Stroop inter-
ference (and facilitation) so that a specific type of conflict 
actually arises at this level. The second issue concerns the 
level(s) of attentional selection: Is there, like Zhang and 
Kornblum (1998) and Zhang et al. (1999) have suggested, 
more than one level at which attentional selection occurs?
With regards to the first issue, we start below by criti-
cally evaluating the evidence for different levels of pro-
cessing that putatively contribute to conflict with the 
objective of assessing the methods used to index the forms 
of conflict, and what we can learn from them. To do this, 
we employed the distinction introduced by MacLeod and 
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MacDonald (2000) who argued for two categories of con-
flict: informational and the aforementioned task conflict 
(see also Levin & Tzelgov, 2016) to further structure the 
review. Informational conflict arises from the semantic 
and response information that the irrelevant word con-
veys. This roughly corresponds to the distinction between 
stimulus-based and response-based conflicts (Kornblum 
& Lee, 1995; Kornblum et al., 1990; Zhang & Kornblum, 
1998; Zhang et al., 1999). According to this approach, 
conflict arises due to overlap between the dimensions of 
the Stroop stimulus at the level of stimulus processing 
(Stimulus–Stimulus or S–S overlap) and at the level of 
response production (Stimulus–Response or S–R over-
lap). At the level of stimulus processing interference can 
occur at the perceptual encoding, memory retrieval, con-
ceptual encoding and stimulus comparison stages. At the 
level of response production interference can also occur 
at response selection, motor programming and response 
execution. In the Stroop task, the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions both involve colors and would, thus, produce 
Stimulus–Stimulus conflict and both stimuli overlap with 
the response (S–R overlap) because the response involves 
color classification. We also include phonological process-
ing and word frequency in the informational conflict taxon 
(cf. Levin & Tzelgov, 2016). We discuss informational 
conflict and its varieties in the first section which is enti-
tled ‘Decomposing Informational conflict’.
Task conflict, as noted above, arises when two task sets 
compete for resources. In the Stroop task, the task set for 
color identification is endogenously and purposively acti-
vated, and the task set for word reading is exogenously 
activated on presentation of the word. The simultaneous 
activation of two task sets creates conflict even before the 
identities of the Stroop dimensions have been processed. 
Therefore, this form of conflict is generated by all irrel-
evant words in the Stroop task including congruent and 
neutral words (Monsell et  al., 2001). We discuss task 
conflict in the section ‘Task conflict’. We then discuss 
the often overlooked phenomenon of Stroop facilitation 
in the section entitled ‘Informational facilitation’. In the 
section entitled “Other evidence relevant to the issue of 
locus vs. loci of the Stroop effect” we consider the influ-
ence of response mode (vocal, manual, oculomotor) on the 
variety of conflicts and facilitation observed in the subsec-
tion ‘Response modes and the loci of the Stroop effect’ 
and we consider whether conflict and facilitation effects 
are resolved even once a response has been favored in the 
subsection ‘Beyond response selection: Stroop effects on 
response execution’. In the final section entitled “Locus or 
loci of selection?”, we use the outcome of these delibera-
tions to discuss the second issue of whether the evidence 
supports attentional selection at a single or at multiple 
loci.
Decomposing informational conflict
A seminal paper by George S. Klein in 1964 (Klein, 1964) 
represents a critical impetus for understanding different 
types of informational conflict. Indeed, up until Klein, all 
studies had utilized incongruent color-word stimuli as the 
irrelevant dimension. Klein was the first to manipulate 
the relatedness of the irrelevant word to the relevant color 
responses to determine the “evocative strength of the printed 
word” (1964, p. 577). To this end, he compared color-
naming times of lists of nonsense syllables, low-frequency 
non-color-related words, high-frequency non-color words, 
words with color-related meanings (semantic associates: 
e.g., lemon, frog, sky), color words that were not in the set 
of possible response colors (non-response set stimuli), and 
color words that were in the set of possible response colors 
(response set stimuli). The response times increased linearly 
in the order they are presented above. Whilst lists of non-
sense syllables vs. low-frequency words, high-frequency 
words vs. semantic-associative stimuli, and semantic-asso-
ciative stimuli vs. non-response set stimuli did not differ, all 
other comparisons were significant.
It is important to underscore that for Klein himself, there 
was no competition between semantic nodes or at any stage 
of processing, and, thus, no need for attentional selection 
other than at the response stage. Only when both irrelevant 
word and relevant color are processed to the point of provid-
ing evidence towards different motor responses, do the two 
sources of information compete. Said differently, whilst he 
questioned the effect of semantic relatedness, Klein assumed 
that semantic relatedness would only affect the strength of 
activation of alternative motor responses. Highlighting his 
favoring of a single late locus for attentional selection, Klein 
noted that words that are semantically distant from the color 
name would be less likely to “arouse the associated motor-
response in competitive intensity” (p. 577). Although others 
(e.g., early selection accounts mentioned above) have argued 
for competition and selection occurring earlier than response 
output, a historically favored view of the Stroop interference 
effect as resulting solely from response conflict has prevailed 
(MacLeod, 1991) such that so-called informational conflict 
(MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000) is viewed as being essen-
tially solely response conflict. That is, the color and word 
dimensions are processed sufficiently to produce evidence 
towards different responses and before the word dimension 
is incorrectly selected, mechanisms of selective attention at 
response output have to either inhibit the incorrect response 
or bias the correct response.
Response and semantic level processing
To assess the extent to which we can (or cannot) move 
forward from this latter view, we describe and critically 
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evaluate methods used to dissociate and measure the poten-
tially independent contributions of response and semantic 
conflict. We start by considering so-called same-response 
trials before going on to consider semantic-associative trials, 
non-response set trials and a method that has used semantic 
distance on the electromagnetic spectrum as a way to deter-
mine the involvement of semantic conflict in the color-word 
Stroop task. Indeed, this is an important first step for deter-
mining whether at this point informational conflict can (or 
cannot) be reliably decomposed.
Same‑response trials
Same-response trials utilize a two-to-one color-response 
mapping and have become the most popular way of distin-
guishing semantic and response conflict in recent studies 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Chen, Lei, Ding, Li, & Chen, 2013a; 
Chen, Tang & Chen, 2013b; Jiang et al., 2015; van Veen 
& Carter, 2005). First introduced by De Houwer (2003), 
this method maps two color responses to the same response 
button (see Fig. 1), which allows for a distinction between 
stimulus–stimulus (lexico-semantic) and stimulus–response 
(response) conflict.
By mapping two response options onto the same response 
key (e.g., both ‘blue’ and ‘yellow’ are assigned to the ‘z’ 
key), certain stimuli combinations (e.g., when blue is printed 
in yellow) are purported to not involve competition at the 
level of response selection; thus, any interference during 
same-response trials is thought to involve only semantic 
conflict. Any additional interference on different-response 
incongruent trials (e.g., when red is printed in yellow and 
where both ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ are assigned to different 
response keys) is taken as an index of response conflict. 
Performance on congruent trials (sometimes referred to as 
identity trials when used in the context of the two-to-one 
color-response mapping paradigm, here after 2:1 paradigm) 
is compared to performance on same-response incongruent 
trials to reveal interference that can be attributed to only 
semantic conflict, whereas a different-response incongru-
ent vs same-response incongruent trial comparison is taken 
as an index of response conflict. Thus, the main advantage 
of using same-response incongruent trials as an index of 
semantic conflict is that this approach claims to be able to 
remove all of the influence of response competition (De 
Houwer, 2003). Notably, according to some models of 
Stroop task performance same-response incongruent trials 
should not produce interference because they do not involve 
response conflict (Cohen, Dunbar & McCelland, 1990; Roe-
lofs, 2003).
Despite providing a seemingly convenient measure 
of semantic and response conflict, the studies that have 
employed the 2:1 paradigm share one major issue—
that of an inappropriate baseline (see MacLeod, 1992). 
Same-response incongruent trials have consistently been 
compared to congruent trials to index semantic conflict. 
However, congruent trials also involve facilitation (both 
response and semantic facilitation—see below for more 
discussion of this) and thus, the difference between these 
two trial types could simply be facilitation and not semantic 
interference, a possibility De Houwer (2003) alluded to in 
his original paper (see also Schmidt et al., 2018). And whilst 
same-response trials plausibly involve semantic conflict, 
they are also likely to involve response facilitation because 
despite being semantically incongruent, the two dimensions 
of this type of Stroop stimulus provide evidence towards 
the same response. This means that both same-response 
and congruent trials involve response facilitation. There-
fore the difference between same-response and congruent 
trials would actually be semantic conflict (experienced on 
same-response trials) + semantic facilitation (experienced on 
congruent trials), not just semantic conflict. This also has 
ramifications for the difference between different-response 
and same-response trials since the involvement of response 
facilitation on same-response trials means that the compar-
ison of these two trials types would actually be response 
conflict plus response facilitation, not just response conflict.
Hasshim and Parris (2014) explored this possibility by 
comparing same-response incongruent trials to non-color-
word neutral trials. They reasoned that this comparison 
could reveal faster RTs to same-response incongruent tri-
als thereby providing evidence for response facilitation on 
same-response trials. In contrast, it could also reveal faster 
RTs to non-color-word neutral trials, thus, would have pro-
vided evidence for semantic interference (and would indicate 
that whatever response facilitation is present is hidden by an 
opposing and greater amount of semantic conflict). Hasshim 
and Parris reported no statistical difference between the RTs 
of the two trial types and reported Bayes Factors indicating 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis of no difference. 
This would suggest that, when using reaction time as the 
index of performance, same-response incongruent trials 
cannot be employed as a measure of semantic conflict since 
they are not different from non-color-word neutral trials. In 
a later study, the same researchers investigated whether the 
two-to-one color-response mapping paradigm could still be 
used to reveal semantic conflict when using a more sensitive 
measure of performance than RT (Hasshim & Parris, 2015). 
They attempted to provide evidence for semantic conflict 
using an oculomotor Stroop task and an early, pre-response 
pupillometric measure of effort, which had previously been 
shown to provide a reliable alternative measure of the poten-
tial differences between conditions (Hodgson et al., 2009). 
However, in line with their previous findings, they reported 
Bayes Factors indicating evidence for no statistical differ-
ence between the same-response incongruent trials and non-
color-word neutral trials. These findings, therefore, suggest 
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that the difference between same-response incongruent tri-
als and congruent trials indexes facilitation on congruent 
trials, and that the former trials are not therefore a reliable 
measure of semantic conflict when reaction times or pupil-
lometry are used as the dependent variable. Notably, Hersh-
man and Henik (2020) included neutral trials in their study 
of the 2:1 paradigm, but did not report statistics comparing 
same-response and neutral trials (although they did report 
differences between same-response and congruent trials 
where the latter had similar RTs to their neutral trials) It is 
clear from their Fig. 1, however, that pupil sizes for neutral 
and same-response trials do begin to diverge at around the 
time the button press response was made. This divergence 
gets much larger ~ 500 ms post-response indicating that a 
difference between the two trial types is detectable using 
pupillometry. Importantly, however, Hershman and Henik 
employed repeated letter string as their neutral condition, 
which does not involve task conflict (see the section on task 
conflict below for more details). This means that any dif-
ferences between their neutral trial and the same-response 
trial could be entirely due to task and not semantic conflict.
However, despite Hasshim and Parris consistently 
reporting no difference between same-response and non-
color-word neutral trials, in an unpublished study, Lakh-
zoum (2017) has reported a significant difference between 
non-color-word neutral trials and same-response trials. 
Lakhzoum’s study contained no special modifications to 
induce a difference between these two trial types, and had 
roughly similar trial and participant numbers and a similar 
experimental set-up to Hasshim and Parris. Yet Lakhzoum 
observed the effect that Hasshim and Parris have consistently 
failed to observe. The one clear difference between Lakh-
zoum (2017), Hasshim and Parris (2014, 2015), however, 
was that Lakhzoum used French participants and presented 
the stimuli in French where Hasshim and Parris conducted 
their studies in English. A question for further research then 
is whether and to what extent language, including issues 
such as orthographic depth of the written script of that lan-
guage, might modify the utility of same-response trials as 
an index of semantic conflict.
Indeed, even though the 2:1 paradigm is prone to limita-
tions, more research is needed to assess its utility for distin-
guishing response and semantic conflict. Notably, in both 
their studies Hasshim and Parris used colored patches as 
the response targets (at least initially, Hasshim & Parris, 
2015, replaced the colored patches with white patches after 
practice trials) which could have reduced the magnitude of 
the Stroop effect (Sugg & McDonald, 1994). Same-response 
trials cannot, for obvious reasons, be used with the com-
monly used vocal response as a means to increase Stroop 
effects (see Response Modes and varieties of conflict section 
below), but future studies could use written word labels, a 
manipulation that has also been shown to increase Stroop 
effects (Sugg & McDonald, 1994), and thus might reveal 
a difference between same-response incongruent and non-
color-word neutral conditions. At the very least future stud-
ies employing same-response incongruent trials should also 
employ a neutral non-color-word baseline (as opposed to 
color patches used by Shichel & Tzelgov, 2018) to properly 
index semantic conflict and should avoid the confounding 
issues associated with congruent trials (see also the section 
on Informational Facilitation below).
As noted above, same-response incongruent trials are 
also likely to involve response facilitation since both dimen-
sions (word and color) provide evidence toward the same 
response. Since congruent trials and same-response incon-
gruent trials both involve response facilitation, the differ-
ence between the two conditions likely represents semantic 
facilitation, not semantic conflict. As a consequence, index-
ing response conflict via the difference between different-
response and same-response trials is also problematic. Until 
further work is done to clarify these issues, work applying 
the 2:1 color-response paradigm to understand the neural 
substrates of semantic and response conflicts (e.g., Van Veen 
& Carter, 2005) or wider issues such as anxiety (Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2014)  remain difficult to interpret.
Non‑response set trials
Non-response set trials are trials on which the irrelevant 
color word used is not part of the response set (e.g., the word 
‘orange’ in blue, where orange is not a possible response 
option and blue is; originally introduced by Klein, 1964). 
Since the non-response set color word will activate color-
processing systems, interference on such trials has been 
interpreted as evidence for conflict occurring at the semantic 
level. These trials should in theory remove the influence of 
response conflict because the irrelevant color word is not a 
possible response option and thus, conflict at the response 
level is not present. The difference in performance between 
the non-response set trials and a non-color-word neutral 
baseline condition (e.g., the word ‘table’ in red) is taken as 
evidence of interference caused by the semantic processing 
of the irrelevant color word (i.e., semantic conflict). In con-
trast, response conflict can be isolated by comparing the dif-
ference between the performance on incongruent trials and 
the non-response set trials. This index of response conflict 
has been referred to as the response set effect (Hasshim & 
Parris, 2018; Lamers et al., 2010) or the response set mem-
bership effect (Sharma & McKenna, 1998) and describes the 
interference that is a result of the irrelevant word denoting 
a color that is also a possible response option. The aim of 
non-response set trials is to provide a condition where the 
irrelevant word is semantically incongruent with the relevant 
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color such that the resultant semantic conflict is the only 
form of conflict present.
It has been argued that the interference measured using 
non-response set trials, the non-response set effect, is an 
indirect measure of response conflict (Cohen et al., 1990; 
Roelofs, 2003) and is, thus, not a measure of semantic 
conflict. That is, the non-response set effect results from 
the semantic link between the non-response set words and 
the response set colors and indirect activation of the other 
response set colors leads to response competition with the 
target color. As far as we are aware there is no study that has 
provided or attempted to provide evidence that is inconsist-
ent with this argument. Thus, for non-response set trials to 
have utility in distinguishing response and semantic conflict, 
future research will need to evidence the independence of 
these types of conflict in RTs and other dependent measures.
Semantic‑associative trials
Another method that has been used to tease apart semantic 
and response conflict employs words that are semantically 
associated with colors (e.g., sky-blue, frog-green). In trials 
of this kind (e.g., sky printed in green), first introduced by 
Klein (1964), the irrelevant words are semantically related 
to each of the response colors. Recall that for Klein this was 
a way of investigating different magnitudes of response con-
flict (the indirect response conflict interpretation). Indeed, 
the notion of comparing RTs on color-associated incon-
gruent trials to those on color-neutral trials to specifically 
isolate semantic conflict (i.e., so-called “sky-put” design) 
was first suggested by Neely and Kahan (2001). It was later 
actually empirically implemented by Manwell, Roberts and 
Besner (2004) and used since in multiple studies investigat-
ing Stroop interference (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014; 
Risko et al., 2006; Sharma & McKenna, 1998; White et al., 
2016).
Interference observed when using semantic associates 
tends to be smaller than when using non-response set trials 
(Klein, 1964; Sharma & McKenna, 1998). This suggests 
that semantic associates may not capture semantic interfer-
ence in its entirety (or alternatively that non-response set 
trials involve some response conflict). Sharma and McKenna 
(1998) postulated that this is because non-response set trials 
involve an additional level of semantic processing which, 
following Neumann (1980) and La Heij, Van der Heijdan, 
and Schreuder (1985), they called semantic relevance (due to 
the fact that color words are also relevant in a task in which 
participants identify colors). It is, however, also the case that 
smaller interference observed with semantic associates com-
pared to non-response set trials can be conceptualized sim-
ply as less semantic association with the response colors for 
non-color words (sky-blue) than for color words (red–blue).
As with non-response set trials, it is unclear whether 
semantic associates exclude the influence of response 
competition because they too can be modeled as indirect 
measures of response conflict (e.g., Roelofs, 2003). Since 
semantic-associative interference could be the result of the 
activation of the set of response colors to which they are 
associated (for instance when sky in red activates compet-
ing response set option blue), it does not allow for a clear 
distinction between semantic and response processes. In 
support of this possibility, Risko et al. (2006) reported that 
approximately half of the semantic-associative Stroop effect 
is due to response set membership and therefore response 
level conflict. The raw effect size of pure semantic-asso-
ciative interference (after interference due to response set 
membership was removed) in their study was only between 
6 ms (manual response, 112 participants) and 10 ms (vocal 
response, 30 participants).
When the same group investigated this issue with a differ-
ent approach (i.e., ex-Gaussian analysis), their conclusions 
were quite different. White and colleagues (2016) found 
the semantic Stroop interference effect (difference between 
semantic-associative and color-neutral trials) in the mean of 
the normal distribution (mu) and in the standard deviation 
of the normal distribution (sigma), but not the tail of the 
RT distribution (tau). This finding was different from past 
studies that found standard Stroop interference in all three 
parameters (see, e.g., Heathcote et al., 1991). Therefore, 
White and colleagues reasoned that the source of the seman-
tic (as opposed standard) Stroop effect is different such that 
the interference associated with response competition on 
standard color-incongruent trials (that is to be seen in tau) is 
absent in incongruent semantic associates. However, White 
et al. only investigated semantic conflict. A more recent 
study that considered both response and semantic conflict 
in the same experiment found they influence similar portions 
of the RT distribution (Hasshim, Downes, Bate, & Parris, 
2019), suggesting that ex-Gaussian analysis cannot be used 
to distinguish the two types of conflict.
Interestingly, Schmidt and Cheesman (2005) explored 
whether semantic-associative trials involve response con-
flict by employing the 2:1 paradigm depicted above. With 
the standard Stroop stimuli, they reported the common dif-
ferences between same- and different-response incongruent 
trials (that are thought to indicate response conflict) and 
between congruent and same-response incongruent (that 
are thought to indicate semantic conflict in the 2:1 para-
digm). However, with semantic-associative stimuli they only 
observed an effect of semantic conflict a finding that differs 
from that of Risko et al. (2006) whose results indicate an 
effect of response conflict with semantic-associative stimuli. 
But, as already noted, the issues associated with employing 
just congruent trials as a baseline in the 2:1 paradigm and 
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the potential response facilitation on same-response trials 
lessens the interpretability of this result.
Complicating matters further still, Lorentz et al. (2016) 
showed that the semantic-associative Stroop effect is not 
present in reaction time data when response contingency (a 
measure of how often an irrelevant word is paired with any 
particular color) is controlled by employing two separate 
contingency-matched non-color-word neutral conditions (but 
see Selimbegovic, Juneau, Ferrand, Spatola & Augustinova, 
2019). There was, however, evidence for Stroop facilitation 
with these stimuli and for interference effects in the error 
data. Nevertheless, studies utilizing semantic-associative 
stimuli that have not controlled for response contingency 
might not have accurately indexed semantic-associative 
interference. Future research should focus on assessing the 
magnitude of the semantic-associative Stroop interference 
effect after the influences of response set membership and 
response contingency have been controlled.
Levin and Tzelgov (2016) also reported that they failed to 
observe the semantic-associative Stroop effect across multi-
ple experiments using a vocal response (in both Hebrew and 
Russian). Only when the semantic associations were primed 
via a training protocol were semantic-associative Stroop 
effects observed, although they were not able to consist-
ently report evidence for the null hypothesis of no difference. 
They subsequently argued that the semantic-associative 
Stroop effect is probably present but is a small and “unsta-
ble” contributor to Stroop interference. This is a somewhat 
surprising conclusion given the small but consistent effects 
reported by others with a vocal response (Klein, 1964; Risko 
et al., 2006; Scheibe et al., 1967; White et al., 2016; see 
Augustinova & Ferrand, 2014, for a review). However, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the semantic-associative 
Stroop effect is not easily observed, especially with a manual 
response (e.g., Sharma & McKenna, 1998).
Finally, any observed semantic-associative interfer-
ence could be interpreted as being an indirect measure of 
response competition (even after factors such as response 
set membership and response contingency are controlled). 
Indeed, the colors associated with the semantic-associative 
stimuli are also linked to the response set colors (Cohen 
et al., 1990; Roelofs, 2003) and thus, semantic associates do 
not generate an unambiguous measure of semantic conflict, 
at least when only RTs are used. Thus, it seems essential 
for future research to investigate this issue with additional, 
and perhaps more refined indicators of response processing 
such as EMGs.
Semantics as distance on the electromagnetic 
spectrum
Klopfer (1996) demonstrated that RTs were slower when 
both dimensions of the Stroop stimulus were closely related 
on the electromagnetic spectrum. The electromagnetic spec-
trum is the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radia-
tion and their wavelengths including those for visible light. 
The visible light portion of the spectrum goes from red 
with the shortest and violet with the longest wavelengths 
with Orange, Yellow, Green and Blue (amongst others) in 
between. The Stroop effect has been reported to be larger 
when the color and word dimensions of the Stroop stimulus 
are close on the spectrum (e.g., blue in green) compared to 
when the colors were distantly related (e.g., blue in red; see 
also Laeng et al., 2005, for an effect of color opponency 
on Stroop interference). In other words, Stroop interference 
is greater when the semantic distance between the color 
denoted by the word and the target color in “color space” is 
smaller, making it seemingly difficult to argue that semantic 
conflict does not contribute to Stroop interference. However, 
Kinoshita, Mills, and Norris (2018) recently failed to rep-
licate this electromagnetic spectrum effect indicating that 
more research is needed to assess whether this is a robust 
effect. Even if replicated, however, this manipulation can-
not escape the interpretation of semantic conflict as being 
the indirect indexing of response conflict. Therefore, these 
replications also call for additional indicators of response 
processing or the lack of thereof.
Can we distinguish the contribution of response 
and semantic processing?
Perhaps due to the past competition between early and 
late selection, single-stage accounts of Stroop interference 
(Logan & Zbrodoff, 1998; MacLeod, 1991) response and 
semantic conflict have historically been the most studied 
and, therefore, compared types of conflict. For instance, 
there is a multitude of studies indicating that semantic con-
flict is often preserved when response conflict is reduced by 
experimental manipulations including hypnosis-like sugges-
tion (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012), priming (Augustinova 
& Ferrand, 2014), Response–Stimulus Interval (Augustinova 
et al., 2018a), viewing position (Ferrand & Augustinova, 
2014a) and single letter coloring (Augustinova & Ferrand, 
2007; Augustinova et al., 2010, 2015, 2018a, 2018b). This 
dissociative pattern (i.e., significant semantic conflict while 
response conflict is reduced or even eliminated) is often 
viewed as indicating two qualitatively distinct types of con-
flict, suggesting that these manipulations result in response 
conflict being prevented. However, these studies have com-
monly employed semantic-associative conflict which could 
be indirectly measuring response conflict and it could, there-
fore, be argued that it is not the type of conflict but simply 
residual response conflict that remains (Cohen et al., 1990; 
Roelofs, 2003). Therefore, it still remains plausible that the 




As we have discussed in this section, interference gener-
ated by both non-response trials and trials that manipulation 
proximity on the electromagnetic spectrum are prone to the 
same limitations. The 2:1 paradigm is a paradigm that could 
in principle remove response conflict from the conflict equa-
tion, but the issues surrounding this manipulation need to be 
further researched before we can be confident of its utility. 
Therefore, at this point, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
published research conducted so far with additional color-
incongruent trial types (same-response, non-response, or 
semantic-associative trials) does not permit the unambigu-
ous conclusion that the informational conflict generated by 
standard color-incongruent trials (word ‘red’ presented in 
blue) can be decomposed into semantic and response con-
flicts. More than ever then, cumulative evidence from more 
time- and process-sensitive measures are required.
Other types of informational conflict: 
considering the role of phonological 
processing and word frequency
Whilst participants are asked to ignore the irrelevant word in 
the color-word Stroop task, it is clear that their attempts to 
do so are not successful. If word processing proceeds in an 
obligatory fashion such that before accessing the semantic 
representation of the irrelevant word, the letters, orthogra-
phy, and phonology are also processed, interference could 
happen at these levels of processing. But, as anticipated by 
Klein (1964), just because the word is processed at these lev-
els does not mean that each leads to level-specific conflict. 
To determine whether or not these different levels of pro-
cessing also independently contribute to Stroop interference, 
various trial types and manipulations have been employed 
that have attempted to dissociate pre-semantic levels of 
processing. The most notable methods are: (1) phonologi-
cal overlap between the irrelevant word and color name; 
(2) the use of pseudowords; and (3) manipulation of word 
frequency. This section attempts to identify whether  pre-
semantic processing of the irrelevant word reliably leads to 
conflict (or facilitation) at levels other than response output.
Phonological overlap between word and color name
A study by Dalrymple-Alford (1972) presented evidence for 
solely phonological interference in the Stroop task. Dalrym-
ple-Alford manipulated the phonemic overlap between the 
irrelevant word and color name. For example, if the color 
to be named was red, the to-be-ignored word would be rat 
(sharing initial phoneme) or pod (sharing the end phoneme) 
or a word that shares no phoneme at all (e.g., fit). Dalrymple-
Alford reported evidence for greater interference at the ini-
tial letter than at the end letter position (similar effects were 
observed for facilitation). Using a more carefully designed 
set of stimuli (originally created by Coltheart et al., 1999, 
who focused on just facilitation), Marmurek et al. (2006) 
also showed greater interference and facilitation at the initial 
letter position than the end letter position; although, in their 
study effects at the end letter position did not reach signifi-
cance. This paradigm represents a direct measure of phono-
logical processing that, importantly, does not have a seman-
tic component (other than the weak conflict that would result 
from the activation of two semantic representations with 
unrelated meanings). However, in line with the interpretation 
by Coltheart et al. (1999), Marmurek and colleagues argued 
it was evidence for phonological processing of the irrelevant 
word that either facilitates or interferes with the production 
of the color name at the response output stage (see also Par-
ris et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Regan, 1978; Singer et al., 
1975). Thus, whilst the word is processed phonologically, 
the only phonological representation with which the result-
ing representation could compete is that created during the 
phonological encoding of the color name, which would only 
be produced at later response processing levels. In sum, it 
is not possible to conclude in favor of qualitatively different 
conflict (or facilitation) other than that at the response level 
using this approach.
Pseudowords
A pseudoword is a non-word that is pronounceable (e.g., 
veglid). In fact, some real words are so rare (e.g., helot, eft) 
that to most they are equivalent to pseudowords. As noted 
above, Klein (1964) used rare words in the Stroop task and 
showed that they interfered less than higher-frequency words 
but more than consonant strings (e.g., GTBND). Both Burt’s 
(2002) and Monsell et al.’s (2001) studies later supported the 
finding that pseudowords result in more interference than 
consonant strings. In recent work, Kinoshita et al. (2017) 
asked what aspects of the reading process is triggered by 
the irrelevant word stimulus to produce interference in the 
color-word Stroop task. They compared performance on five 
types of color-neutral letter strings to incongruent words. 
They included real words (e.g., hat), pronounceable non-
words (or pseudowords; e.g., hix), consonant strings (e.g., 
hdk), non-alphabetic symbol strings (e.g., &@£), and a row 
of Xs. They reported that there was a word-likeness or pro-
nounceability gradient with real words and pseudowords 
showing an equal amount of interference (with interference 
increasing with string length) and more than that produced 
by the consonant strings. Consonant strings produced more 
interference than the symbol strings and the row of Xs 
which did not differ from each other. The absence of the 
lexicality effect (defined by color-neutral real words pro-
ducing more interference than pseudowords) was explained 
by Kinoshita and colleagues as being a consequence of the 
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pre-lexically generated phonology from the pronounceable 
irrelevant words interfering with the speech production pro-
cesses involved in naming the color. Under this account, 
the process of phonological encoding (the segment-to-frame 
association processes in articulation planning) of the color 
name must be slowed by the computation of phonology that 
occurs independent of lexical status (because it happens 
with pronounceable pseudowords). Notably, the authors 
reported evidence for pre-lexically generated phonology 
when participants responded vocally (by saying aloud the 
color name), but not when participants responded manually 
(by pressing a key that corresponds to the target color) sug-
gesting the effects were the result of the need to articulate 
the color name.
Some pseudowords can sound like color words (e.g., 
bloo), and are known as pseudohomophones. Besner and 
Stolz (1998) employed pseudohomophones as the irrelevant 
dimension, and found substantial Stroop effects when com-
pared to a neutral baseline (see also Lorentz et al., 2016; 
Monahan, 2001) suggesting that there is phonological con-
flict in the Stroop task. However, pseudohomophones do 
not involve only phonological conflict since they contain 
substantial orthographic overlap with their base words (e.g., 
bloo, yeloe, grene, wred) and will likely activate the seman-
tic representations of the colors indicated by the word via 
their shared phonology. In short, interference produced by 
pseudohomophones could result from phonological, ortho-
graphic, or semantic processing but also and importantly it 
can still simply result from response conflict (see also Tzel-
gov et al., 1996, work on cross-script homophones which 
shows phonologically mediated semantic/response conflict, 
but not phonological conflict).
Taken together, this work shows a clear effect of pho-
nological processing of the irrelevant word on Stroop task 
performance; and one that likely results from the pre-lexical 
phonological processing of the irrelevant word. Again, how-
ever, it is unclear whether the resulting competition arises at 
the pre-lexical level (suggesting the color name’s pre-lexical 
phonological representation is unnecessarily activated) or 
whether phonological processing of the irrelevant word 
leads to phonological encoding of that word that then inter-
feres with the phonological encoding of the relevant color 
name. The latter seems more likely than the former.
High‑ vs. low‑frequency words
In support of the notion that non-semantic lexical factors 
contribute to Stroop effects, studies have shown an effect of 
the word frequency of non-color-related words on Stroop 
interference. Word frequency refers to the likelihood of 
encountering that word in reading and conversation. It is 
a factor that has long been known to contribute to word 
reading latency, and given that color words tend to be 
high-frequency words, it is possible word frequency con-
tributes to Stroop effects. Whilst the locus of word frequency 
effects in word reading are unclear, it is known that it takes 
longer to access lexico-semantic (phonological/semantic) 
representations of low-frequency words (Gherhand & Barry, 
1998, 1999; Monsell et al., 1989).
According to influential models of the Stroop task, the 
magnitude of Stroop interference is determined by the 
strength of the connection between the irrelevant word and 
the response output level (Cohen et al., 1990; Kalanthroff 
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 1999). Since high-frequency words 
are by definition encountered more often, their strength of 
connection to the response output level would be higher than 
that for low-frequency words. This leads to the prediction 
that color-naming times should be longer when the distrac-
tor word is of a higher frequency. Evidence in support of 
this has been reported by Klein (1964), Fox et al. (1971) 
and Scheibe et al. (1967). However, Monsell et al. (2001) 
pointed out methodological issues in these older studies 
that could have confounded the results. First, these previ-
ous studies employed the card presentation version of the 
Stroop task in which the items from each stimulus condition 
(e.g., all the high-frequency words) are placed on different 
cards and the time taken to respond to all the items on one 
card is recorded. This method, it was argued, could result in 
the adoption of different response criteria for the different 
cards and permits previews of the next stimulus which could 
result in overlap of processing. Second, Monsell et al. noted 
that these studies employed a limited set of 4–5 stimuli in 
each condition which were repeated numerous times on each 
card, potentially leading to practice effects that would poten-
tially nullify any effects of word frequency. After addressing 
these issues, Monsell et al. (2001) reported no effects of 
word frequency on color-naming times, although there was 
a non-significant tendency for low-frequency words to result 
in more interference than high-frequency words. With the 
same methodological control as Monsell et al., but with a 
greater difference in frequency between the high and low 
conditions, Burt (1994, 1999, 2002) has repeatedly reported 
that low-frequency words produce significantly more inter-
ference than high-frequency words (findings recently rep-
licated by Navarrete et al., 2015). A recent study by Levin 
and Tzelgov (2016) also reported more interference to low-
frequency words although their effects were not consistent 
across experiments, a finding that could be attributed to their 
use of a small set of words for each class of words.
The repeated finding of greater interference for low-
frequency words is consistent with the notion that word 
frequency contributes to determining response times in the 
Stroop task, but is inconsistent with predictions from models 
of the class exemplified by Cohen et al. (1990). The find-
ing of larger Stroop effects for lower-frequency words pro-
vides a potent challenge to the many models based on the 
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Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) connectionist frame-
work (Cohen et al., 1990; Kalanthroff et al., 2018; Kornblum 
et al., 1990; Kornblum & Lee, 1995; Zhang & Kornblum, 
1998; Zhang et al., 1999; see Monsell et al., 2001 for a full 
explanation of this). As noted, these models would argue, on 
the basis of a fundamental tenet of their architectures, that 
higher-frequency words should produce greater interference 
because they have stronger connection strengths with their 
word forms. Notably, whilst unsupported by later studies, 
the lack of an effect of word frequency in Monsell et al.’s 
data led them to the conclusion that there was another type 
of conflict involved in the Stroop task, called task conflict. 
It is to the topic of task conflict that we now turn.
Task conflict
The presence of task conflict in the Stroop task was first 
proposed in MacLeod and MacDonald’s (2000) review of 
brain imaging studies (see also Monsell et al., 2001; see 
Littman et al., 2019, for a mini review). The authors pro-
posed its existence because the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) appeared to be more activated by incongruent and 
congruent stimuli when compared to repeated letter neutral 
stimuli such as xxxx (e.g., Bench et al., 1993). MacLeod 
and MacDonald suggested that increased ACC activation 
by congruent and incongruent stimuli reflects the signaling 
the need for control recruitment in response to task conflict. 
Since task conflict is produced by the activation of the men-
tal machinery used to read, interference at this level occurs 
with any stimulus that is found in the mental lexicon. Studies 
have used this logic to isolate task conflict from informa-
tional conflict (e.g., Entel & Tzelgov, 2018).
Congruent trials, proportion of repeated letter 
strings trials and negative facilitation
In contrast to color-incongruent trials that are thought 
to produce both task and informational conflicts, color-
congruent trials are only thought to produce task conflict. 
Conflict of any type, by definition, increases response 
times and thus, congruent trial reaction times can be 
expected to be longer than those on trials that do not acti-
vate a task set for word reading. Repeated color patches, 
symbols or letters (e.g., ■■■, xxxx or ####) have, there-
fore, been introduced as a baseline for such a comparison. 
Indeed, these trials are not expected to generate task con-
flict as they do not activate an item in the mental lexicon. 
The difference between these non-linguistic baselines and 
congruent trials would therefore represent a measure of 
task conflict, and has been referred to as negative facilita-
tion. However, a common finding in such experiments is 
that congruent trials still produce faster RTs than neutral 
non-word stimuli or positive facilitation (Entel et al., 2015; 
see also Augustinova et al., 2019; Levin & Tzelgov, 2016, 
Shichel & Tzelgov, 2018), indicating that task conflict is 
not fully measured under such conditions. Goldfarb and 
Henik (2007) reasoned that this is likely due to the fact 
that faster responses on congruent trials compared to a 
non-linguistic baseline results when task conflict control 
is highly efficient, permitting the expression of positive 
facilitation.
To circumvent this issue, they attempted to reduce task 
conflict control by increasing the proportion of non-word 
neutral trials (repeated letter strings) to 75% (see also Kalan-
throff et al., 2013). Increasing the proportion of non-word 
neutral trials would create the expectation for a low task 
conflict context and so task conflict monitoring would effec-
tively be offline. In addition to increasing the proportion of 
non-word neutral trials, on half of the trials, the participants 
received cues that indicated whether the following stimulus 
would be a non-word or a color word, giving another indica-
tion as to whether the mechanisms that control task conflict 
should be activated. For non-cued trials, when presumably 
task conflict control was at its nadir, and therefore task con-
flict at its peak, RTs were slower for congruent trials than 
for non-word neutral trials, producing a negative facilitation 
effect. Goldfarb and Henik (2007) suggested that previous 
studies had not detected a negative facilitation effect because 
resolving task conflict for congruent stimuli does not take 
long, and thus, as mentioned above, the effects of positive 
facilitation had hidden those of negative facilitation. In sum, 
by reducing task control both globally (by increasing the 
proportion of neutral trials) and locally (by adding cues to 
half of the trials), Goldfarb and Henik were able to increase 
task conflict enough to demonstrate a negative facilitation 
effect; an effect that has been shown to be a robust and prime 
signature of task conflict (Goldfarb & Henik, 2006, 2007; 
Kalantroff et al., 2013).
Steinhauser and Hübner (2009) manipulated task conflict 
control by combining the Stroop task with a task-switching 
paradigm. In this paradigm participants switch between 
color naming and reading the irrelevant word (see Kalan-
throff et al., 2013, for a discussion on task switching and 
task conflict). Thus, the two task sets are active in this task 
context. This means that during color-naming Stroop trials, 
the word dimension of the stimulus will be more strongly 
associated with word processing than it otherwise would. 
This would have the effect of increasing the conflict between 
the task set for color naming and the task set of word read-
ing. Steinhauser and Hübner (2009) found that under these 
experimental conditions, participants performed worse on 
congruent (and incongruent) trials than they did on the non-
word neutral trials, evidencing negative facilitation, the key 
marker of task conflict. These results showing increasing 
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task conflict when there is less control over the task set for 
word reading on color-naming trials reaffirmed Goldfarb and 
Henik’s (2007) findings that showed that reducing task con-
trol on color-naming trials leads to task conflict.
Whilst both of the above methods are useful in show-
ing that task conflict can influence the magnitude of Stroop 
interference and facilitation, both manipulations result in 
magnifying task conflict (and likely other forms of conflict) 
to levels greater than is present when such targeted manipu-
lations are not used.
Repeated letter strings without a task conflict 
control manipulation
As has been noted, task conflict appears to be present when-
ever the irrelevant stimulus has an entry in the lexical sys-
tem. Consequently, studies have used the contrast in mean 
color-naming latencies between color-neutral words and 
repeated letter strings to index task conflict (Augustinova 
et al., 2018a; Levin & Tzelgov, 2016). However, Augusti-
nova et al. argued that both of these stimuli might include 
task conflict in different quantities. This is because the pro-
cessing activated by a string of repeated letters (e.g., xxx) 
stops at the orthographic pre-lexical level, whereas the one 
activated by color-neutral words (e.g., dog) proceeds through 
to access to meaning (see also Augustinova et al., 2019; Fer-
rand et al., 2020), and as such the latter might more strongly 
activate the task set for word reading. Augustinova et al. 
(2019) reported task conflict (color-neutral—repeated let-
ter strings) with vocal responses but not manual responses. 
Likewise, in a manual response study, Hershman et  al. 
(2020) reported that repeated letter strings did not differ in 
terms of Stroop interference relative to symbol strings, con-
sonant strings and color-neutral words. All were responded 
to more slowly than congruent trials, however, evidencing 
facilitation on congruent trials. Levin and Tzelgov (2016) 
compared vocal response color-naming times of repeated 
letter strings and shapes and found that repeated letter strings 
had longer color-naming times indicating some level of extra 
conflict with repeated letter strings, which they referred to 
as orthographic conflict, but which could also be expected 
to activate a task set for word reading. The implication of 
this work is that whilst repeated letter strings can be used as 
a baseline against which to measure task conflict relative to 
color-neutral words, they are likely to be useful mainly with 
vocal responses (Augustinova et al., 2019), and moreover 
can be expected to lead to some level of task conflict (Levin 
& Tzelgov, 2016).
For a purer measure of task conflict, when eschewing 
manipulations needed to produce negative facilitation, future 
research would do better to compare response times for 
color-neutral stimuli with those for shapes whilst employ-
ing a vocal response (Levin & Tzelgov, 2016; see Parris 
et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, who reported no difference 
between color-neutral stimuli and unnamable/novel shapes 
with a manual response in an fMRI experiment). This does 
not mean, however, that task conflict is not measureable with 
manual responses in designs that eschew manipulations that 
produce negative facilitation: Continuing with their explora-
tion of Stroop effects in pupillometric data Hershman et al. 
(2020) reported that pupil size data revealed larger pupils to 
congruent than to repeated letter strings (and also symbol 
strings, consonant strings and non-color-related words); in 
other words, they reported negative facilitation.
Does task conflict precede informational conflict?
The studies discussed above also suggest that task con-
flict occurs earlier than informational conflict. Hershman 
and Henik (2019) recently provided evidence that sup-
ports this supposition. Using incongruent, congruent and a 
repeated letter string baseline, but without manipulating the 
task conflict context in a way that would produce negative 
facilitation, Hershman and Henik observed a large interfer-
ence effect and small non-significant, positive facilitation. 
However, the authors also recorded pupil dilations during 
task performance and reported both interference and nega-
tive facilitation (pupils were smaller for the repeated letter 
string condition than for congruent stimuli). Importantly, 
the pupil data began to distinguish between the repeated 
letter string condition and the two word conditions (incon-
gruent and congruent) up to 500 ms before there was diver-
gence between the incongruent and congruent trials. In other 
words, task conflict appeared earlier than informational con-
flict in the pupil data.
If it is not firmly established that task conflict comes 
before informational conflict on a single trial, recent research 
has shown that it certainly seems to come first developmen-
tally. By comparing performance in 1st, 3rd and 5th grad-
ers, Ferrand and colleagues (2020) showed that 1st graders 
experience smaller Stroop interference effects (even when 
controlling for processing speed differences) compared to 
3rd and 5th graders. Importantly, whereas the Stroop inter-
ference effect in these older children is largely driven by the 
presence of response, semantic and task conflict, in the 1st 
graders (i.e., pre-readers) this interference effect was entirely 
due to task conflict. Indeed, these children produced slower 
color-naming latencies for all items using words as distrac-
tors compared to repeated letter strings, without being sensi-
tive to color-(in)congruency and to the informational (pho-
nological, semantic or. response) conflict that it generates. 
The finding of task conflict’s developmental precedence is 
consistent with the idea that visual expertise for letters (as 
evidence by aforementioned N170 tuning for print) is known 
to be present even in pre‐readers (Maurer et al., 2005).
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A model of task conflict
Kalanthroff et al. (2018) presented a model of Stroop task 
performance that is based on processing principles of Cohen 
and colleagues’ models (Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al, 
1990). What is unique about their model is the role pro-
active (intentional, sustained) control plays in modifying 
task conflict (see Braver, 2012). When proactive control is 
strong, bottom-up activation of  word reading is weak, and 
top-down control resolves any remaining task competition 
rapidly. Conversely, when proactive control is weak, bottom-
up information can activate task representations more read-
ily leading to greater task conflict. According to their model, 
the presence of task conflict inhibits all response representa-
tions, effectively raising the response threshold and slowing 
responses. This raising of the response threshold would not 
happen for repeated letter string trials (e.g., xxxx) because 
the task unit for word reading would not be activated. Since 
responses for congruent trials would be slowed, negative 
facilitation results. To control task conflict when it arises, 
Kalanthroff et al. (2018) argued that due to the low level of 
proactive control, reactive control is triggered to resolve task 
conflict via the weak top-down input from the controlling 
module in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex. Thus, in contrast 
to Botvinick et al.’s (2001) model, reactive control is trig-
gered by weak proactive control, not the detection of infor-
mational conflict. When proactive control is high, there is 
no task conflict, and the reactive control mechanism is not 
triggered, and the response convergence at the response level 
leads to response facilitation which can be fully expressed. 
Since task conflict control is not reliant on the presence of 
intra-trial informational conflict, and it is not resolved at the 
response output level, it is resolved by an independent con-
trol mechanism. Thus, the Kalanthroff et al. model predicts 
the independent resolution of response and task conflict.
In sum, task conflict has been shown to be an important 
contributor to both Stroop interference and Stroop facilita-
tion effects. Task conflict can result in the reduction of the 
Stroop facilitation effect, increased Stroop interference, and 
in its more extreme form, it can produce negative facilitation 
(RTs to congruent trials are longer than those to a non-word 
neutral baseline). A concomitant decrease in Stroop facili-
tation and increase in Stroop interference (or vice versa) is 
also another potential marker of task conflict (Parris, 2014), 
although since a reduced Stroop facilitation and an increased 
Stroop interference can be produced by other mechanisms 
(i.e., decreased word reading/increased attention to the color 
dimension and increased response conflict, respectively), at 
this point, negative facilitation is clearly the best marker of 
task conflict (in RT or pupil data; Hershman & Henik, 2019). 
Kalanthroff et al. (2018) have argued that task conflict is 
a result of low levels of proactive control. However, more 
work is perhaps needed to identify what triggers activation 
of the task set for word reading and how types of informa-
tional conflict might interact with task conflict. Levin and 
Tzelgov (2016) describe informational conflict as being an 
“episodic amplification of task interference” (p3), where task 
conflict is a marker of the automaticity of reading and infor-
mational conflict the effect of dimensional overlap between 
stimuli and responses. With recent evident suggesting read-
ability is a key factor in producing task conflict (Hershman 
et al., 2020), task conflict is possibly closely related to the 
ease with which a string of letters is phonologically encoded, 
its pronounceability (Kinoshita et al., 2017), suggesting a 
link between task and phonological conflict. Indeed, Levin 
and Tzelgov (2016) associated the orthographic and lexical 
components of word reading with task conflict. However, 
it is unclear how phonological processing is categorized in 
their framework and importantly how facilitation effects are 
accounted for under such a taxonomy.
Informational facilitation
As already mentioned, Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr (1966, 
Exp. 2) were the first to report a facilitation effect of the 
irrelevant word on color naming (see also Dalrymple-Alford, 
1972 for coining the term). Since then, the Stroop facilita-
tion effect has become an oft-present effect in Stroop task 
performance and is usually measured by the difference in 
color-naming performance on non-color-word trials and 
color-congruent trials. However, the use of congruent trials 
is, more than any other trial type, fraught with confounding 
issues. As amply developed in the previous section, when 
task conflict is high, congruent word trial RTs can actually 
be longer than non-color-word trial RTs eliminating the 
expression of positive facilitation in the RT data and even 
producing negative facilitation (Goldfarb & Henik, 2007). 
Indeed, perhaps the first record of task conflict in the Stroop 
literature, Heathcote et al. (1991) reported that whilst the 
arithmetic mean difference between color-congruent and 
color-neutral trial types reveals facilitation in the Gaussian 
portion of the RT distribution, it actually reveals interference 
in the tail of the RT distribution. In sum, congruent trial RTs 
are clearly influenced by processes that pull RTs in different 
directions. Moreover, it has been argued that Stroop facilita-
tion effects are not true facilitation effects at all, in the sense 
that the faster RTs on congruent trials do not represent the 
benefit of converging information from the two dimensions 
of the Stroop stimulus (see below for a further discussion of 
this issue). Thus, before considering what levels of process-
ing contribute to facilitation effects, we must first consider 




Since clear empirical demonstrations of task conflict 
being triggered by color-congruent trials were reported 
(see above), it has become difficult to consider the Stroop 
facilitation effect as a flip side of the Stroop interference 
(Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966). Stroop facilitation is 
often observed to be smaller, and less consistent, than Stroop 
interference (MacLeod, 1991) and this asymmetricity is 
largely dependent on the baseline used (Brown, 2011). Yet, 
this asymmetrical effect has been accounted for by models 
of the Stroop task via informational facilitation (i.e., with-
out considering the opposing effect of task conflict). For 
example, in Cohen et al.’s (1990) model smaller positive 
facilitation is accounted for via a non-linear activation func-
tion which imposes a ceiling effect on the activation of the 
correct response—in other words, double the input (con-
vergence) does not translate into double the output (Cohen 
et al., 1990).
MacLeod and McDonald (2000) and Kane and Engle 
(2003) have argued that the facilitating effect of the color-
congruent irrelevant word is not true facilitation from any 
level of processing and is instead the result of ‘inadvertent 
reading’. That is, on some color-congruent trials, partici-
pants use only the word dimension to generate a response, 
meaning that these responses would be 100 ms–200 ms 
faster than if they were color naming (because word reading 
is that much faster than color naming). The argument is that 
it happens on only the occasional congruent trial (because of 
the penalty (error or large RTs) that would result from car-
rying it over to incongruent trials). Doing this occasionally 
would equate to the roughly 25 ms Stroop facilitation effect 
observed in most studies and would explain why facilita-
tion is generally smaller than interference. Since the color-
naming goal is not predicted to be active on these occasional 
congruent trials, it implies that only the task set for word 
reading is active, and hence the absence (or a large reduc-
tion) of task conflict, which fits with the finding of more 
informational facilitation in low task conflict contexts. Inad-
vertent reading would also be expected to produce facilita-
tion in the early portion of the reaction time distribution (as 
supported by Heathcote et al.’s findings).
Roelofs (2010) argued, however, that with cross-language 
stimuli presented to bilingual participants, words cannot 
be read aloud to produce facilitation between languages 
(i.e., the Dutch word Rood—meaning ‘red’—cannot be 
read aloud to produce the response ‘red’ by Dutch–English 
bilinguals). Roelofs (2010) asked Dutch–English bilingual 
participants to name color patches either in Dutch or Eng-
lish whilst trying to ignore contiguously presented Dutch 
or English words. Given that informational facilitation 
effects were observed both within and between languages, 
Roelofs argued that the Stroop facilitation effect cannot be 
based on inadvertent reading. However, whilst Rood (Red), 
Groen (Green), and Blau (Blue) are not necessarily phono-
logically similar to their English counterparts, they clearly 
share orthographic similarities, which could produce facili-
tation effects (including semantic facilitation). Still, Roelofs 
observed large magnitudes of facilitation effects rendering it 
less likely that facilitation was based solely on orthography, 
although this was primarily when the word preceded the 
onset of the color patch. There were indeed relatively small 
facilitation effects when the word and color were presented 
at the same time. Nevertheless, the inadvertent reading 
account also cannot easily explain facilitation on semantic-
associative congruent trials (see below for evidence of this) 
since the word does not match the response.
Another influence that can account for the facilitating 
effect of congruent trials is response contingency. Response 
contingency refers to the association between an irrelevant 
word and a response. In a typical Stroop task set-up, the 
numbers of congruent and incongruent trials are matched 
(e.g., 48 congruent/48 incongruent). Since in each congruent 
trial, there is only one possible word to pair with each color, 
it means that each color word is more frequently paired with 
its corresponding color (when the word red is displayed, 
there is a higher probability of its color being red). This 
would mean that responses on congruent trials would be fur-
ther facilitated through learned word–response associations, 
and those on incongruent trials further slowed, by something 
other than and additional to the consequence of word pro-
cessing (Melara & Algom, 2003; Schmidt & Besner, 2008). 
Indeed, it is as yet unclear as to whether informational facili-
tation would remain if facilitative effects of response contin-
gency were controlled. Therefore, future studies are needed 
to address this still open issue (see Lorentz et al., 2016 for 
this type of endeavor but with semantic associates).
Decomposing informational facilitation
Perhaps because it has been perceived as the lesser, and 
less stable effect, the Stroop facilitation effect has not been 
explored as much as the Stroop interference effect in terms 
of potential varieties of which it may be comprised (Brown, 
2011). Coltheart et al. (1999) have shown that when the 
irrelevant word and the color share phonemes (e.g., rack 
in red, boss in blue), participants are faster to name the 
color than when they do not (e.g., hip in red, mock in blue). 
Given that none of the words used in their experiment con-
tained color relations, their effect was likely entirely based 
on phonological facilitation (see also Dennis & Newstead, 
1981; Marmurek et al., 2006; Parris et al., 2019a, 2019b, 
2019c; Regan, 1979). Notably, effects such as this could not 
be explained by either the inadvertent reading nor response 
convergence accounts of Stroop facilitation and could not 
have resulted from response contingency (whilst any word 
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in red, green or blue would have a greater chance of begin-
ning with an ‘r’, ‘g’ and ‘b’ than any other letter respectively, 
there were three times as many trials in which the words did 
not begin with those letters). It is possible, however, that 
phonological facilitation operates on a different mechanism 
to semantic and response facilitation effects.
To the best of our knowledge only four published stud-
ies have explored this variety of informational facilita-
tion directly. Dalrymple-Alford (1972) reported a 42 ms 
semantic-associative facilitation effect (non-color-word 
neutral—semantic-associative congruent) and a 67  ms 
standard facilitation effect (non-color-word neutral—con-
gruent) suggesting a response facilitation effect of 25 ms 
(see Glaser & Glaser, 1989; and Mahon et al., 2012, for rep-
lications of this effect). Interestingly, however, when com-
pared to a letter string baseline (e.g., xxxx), the congruent 
semantic associates actually produced interference—a find-
ing implicating an influence of task conflict. More recently, 
Augustinova et al. (2019) reported semantic (11 ms) and 
response (39 ms) facilitation effects with vocal responses 
but only semantic facilitation (14 ms) with manual responses 
(response facilitation was a non-significant 7 ms). Interest-
ingly, the comparison between the letter string baseline and 
congruent semantic associates produced 9 ms facilitation 
with the manual response, but 33 ms interference with the 
vocal response suggesting a complex relationship between 
response mode, semantic facilitation and task conflict. 
Indeed, exactly like color-congruent items discussed above, 
both congruent semantic-associative trials and their color-
neutral counterpart with no facilitatory components still 
involve task conflict.
These (potentially) isolable forms of facilitation are inter-
esting, require further study, and have the potential to shed 
light on impairments in selective attention and cognitive 
control. Of particular interest is how these forms of facilita-
tion are modified by the presence of various levels of task 
conflict. Nevertheless, as with semantic conflict, it is pos-
sible that apparent semantic facilitation effects result from 
links between the irrelevant dimension and the response set 
colors (Roelofs, 2003) meaning that they are response- and 
not semantically based effects. Therefore, other approaches 
are needed to tackle the issue of semantic (vs. response) 
facilitation. It might be useful to recall at this point that both 
Roelofs’ (2010) cross-language findings and the differences 
in reaction times between congruent and same-response tri-
als (e.g., De Houwer, 2003) possibly result from semantic 
facilitation and so would not be helpful in this regard.
Other evidence relevant to the issue of locus 
vs. loci of the Stroop effect
Response modes and the loci of the Stroop effect
Responding manually (via keypress) in the Stroop task con-
sistently leads to smaller Stroop effects when compared to 
responding vocally (saying the name aloud, e.g., Augusti-
nova et al., 2019; McClain, 1983; Redding & Gerjets, 1977; 
Repovš, 2004; Sharma & McKenna, 1998). It has been 
argued that this is because each response type has differ-
ential access to the lexicon where interference is proposed 
to occur (Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Kinoshita et al., 2017; 
Sharma & McKenna, 1998). Indeed, smaller Stroop effects 
with manual (as opposed to vocal) responses has been attrib-
uted to one of its components (i.e., semantic conflict) being 
significantly reduced (Brown & Besner, 2001; Sharma & 
McKenna, 1998). Therefore, the manipulation of response 
mode has been used to address the issue of the locus of the 
Stroop effect.
In response to reports of failing to observe Stroop effects 
with manual responses (e.g., McClain, 1983), Glaser and 
Glaser (1989) proposed in their model that manual responses 
with color patches on the response keys could not produce 
interference because perception of the color and the response 
to it were handled by the semantic system with little or no 
involvement of the lexical system where interference was 
proposed to occur. However, based on the earlier translation 
models (e.g., Virzi & Egeth, 1985), Sugg and McDonald 
(1994) showed that Stroop interference was obtained with 
manual responses when the response buttons were labeled 
with written color words instead of colored patches. Sugg 
and McDonald argued that written label responses must have 
direct access to the lexical system.
Using written label manual responses, Sharma and McK-
enna (1998) tested Glaser and Glaser’s model and showed 
that response mode matters when considering the types 
of conflict that participants experience in the Stroop task. 
They reported that in contrast to vocal responses, manual 
responses produced no lexico-semantic interference as 
measured by comparing semantic-associative and non-
color-word neutral trials, and by comparing non-response 
set trials with semantic-associative trials, although they did 
report a response set effect (response set—non-response set) 
with both vocal (spoken) and manual responses. Sharma and 
McKenna interpreted their results as being partially con-
sistent with Glaser and Glaser’s model, suggesting that the 
types of conflict experienced in the Stroop task are differ-
ent between response modes. However, Brown and Besner 
(2001) later re-analyzed the data from Sharma and McKenna 
and showed that if you do not only analyze adjacent condi-
tions (with condition order determined by a priori beliefs 
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about the magnitude of Stroop effects) and compare instead 
non-adjacent conditions such as non-response set and non-
color-word neutral trials (the non-response set effect), 
semantic conflict is observed with a manual response.
Roelofs (2003) has theorized that interference with 
manual responses only occurs because verbal labels are 
attached to the response keys; such a position predicts that 
manual and vocal responses should lead to similar conflict 
and facilitation effects, but smaller overall effects with 
manual responses due to the proposed mediated nature of 
manual Stroop effects. Consistently, many studies have since 
reported robust interference effects including semantic con-
flict effects with manual responses using colored patch labels 
(as measured by non-response set—non-color-word neutral, 
e.g., Hasshim & Parris, 2018; or as measured by semantic-
associative Stroop trials, e.g., Augustinova et al., 2018a). 
Parris et al., (2019a, 2019b), Zahedi, Rahman, Stürmer, & 
Sommer (2019) and Kinoshita et al. (2017) have reported 
data indicating that the difference between manual and 
vocal responses occurs later in the phonological encod-
ing or articulation planning stage where vocal responses 
encourage greater phonological encoding than does the 
manual response (see Van Voorhis & Dark, 1995 for a simi-
lar argument).
Augustinova et al. (2019) have reported that the differ-
ence between manual and vocal responses is largely due to a 
larger contribution of response conflict with vocal responses. 
Yet, in addition they also reported a much larger contribution 
of task conflict with vocal responses. Notably, the contri-
bution of both semantic conflict and semantic facilitation 
remained roughly the same for the response modes, whereas 
response facilitation increased dramatically (from non-sig-
nificant 7 ms to 39 ms) with vocal responses indicating that 
response and semantic forms of facilitation are independent. 
Therefore, the research to date suggests that there are larger 
response- and task-based effects with vocal responses. Since 
negative facilitation was not used as a measure of perfor-
mance in this study, which has been reported with manual 
responses (e.g., Goldfarb & Henik, 2007), one needs to be 
careful what conclusions are drawn about task conflict; nev-
ertheless, task conflict does seem to contribute less to Stroop 
effects with manual responses under common Stroop task 
conditions in which task conflict control is not manipulated. 
Importantly, this only applies to response times. As already 
noted, Hershman and Henik (2019) reported no task conflict 
with manual responses but also showed that in the same 
participants pupil sizes changes revealed task conflict in the 
form of negative facilitation on the very same trials.
It is important that more research investigating how the 
make-up of Stroop interference might change with response 
mode is conducted, especially since other response modes 
such as typing (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1998), oculomotor 
(Hasshim & Parris, 2015; Hodgson et al., 2009) and mouse 
(Bundt, Ruitenberg, Abrahamse, & Notebaert, 2018) 
responses have been utilized. This is especially important 
given that a lesion to the ACC has been reported to affect 
manual but not vocal response Stroop effects (Turken & 
Swick, 1999). Up until very recently very little consider-
ation has been given to how response mode might affect 
Stroop facilitation effects (Augustinova et al., 2019) so 
more research is needed to better understand the influence 
of response mode on facilitation effects. Indeed, as noted 
above models have proposed either the same or different 
processes underlying manual and vocal Stroop effects pro-
viding predictions that need to be more fully tested. Aside 
from issues surrounding measurement of the varieties of 
conflict and facilitation that underlie  Stroop effects with 
manual and vocal responses, mitigating the conclusions that 
can be drawnfrom the work summarized in this section, it is 
interesting that the way we act on the Stroop stimulus can 
potentially change how it is processed.
Beyond response selection: Stroop effects 
on response execution
So far, we have concentrated on Stroop effects that occur 
before response selection. However, it is also possible that 
Stroop effects could be observed after (or during) response 
selection. When addressing questions about the locus of the 
Stroop effect, some studies have questioned the commonly 
held assumption that there is modularity between response 
selection and response execution; that is, they have con-
sidered whether interference experienced at the level of 
response selection spills over into the actual motoric action 
of the effectors (e.g., the time it takes to articulate the color 
name) or whether interference is entirely resolved before 
then. Researchers have considered this possibility with vocal 
(measuring the time between the production of the first pho-
neme and the end of the last; Kello et al., 2000), type-written 
(measuring the time between the pressing of the first letter 
key and the pressing of the last letter key; Logan & Zbrodoff, 
1998), oculomotor (measuring the amplitude (size) of the 
saccade (eye movement) to the target color patch; Hodg-
son, Parris, Jarvis & Gregory, 2009), and mouse movement 
(Bundt et al., 2018; Yamamoto, Incera & McLennan, 2016) 
responses.
In Hodgson et al.’s (2009) study, participants responded 
by making an eye movement to one of four color patches 
located in a plus-sign configuration around the centrally 
presented Stroop stimulus to indicate the font color of the 
Stroop stimulus. In two experiments, one in which the tar-
get’s color remained in the same location throughout the 
experiment and one in which the colors occupied a different 
patch location (still in the plus-sign configuration) on every 
trial, Stroop interference effects were observed on saccadic 
latency, but not on saccade amplitude or velocity indicating 
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that all interference is resolved before a motor movement is 
made and, therefore, that Stroop interference does not affect 
response execution. Similar null effects on response execu-
tion were reported for type-written responses across four 
experiments by Logan and Zbrodoff (1998).
Kello et al. (2000) initially also observed no Stroop effects 
on vocal naming durations (the time it takes to actually 
vocalize the response). In a follow-up experiment, however, 
in which they introduced a response deadline of 575 ms, 
they observed Stroop congruency effects on response dura-
tions. This likely holds for the other studies on response 
execution mentioned here. Indeed, Hodgson et al. pointed 
out that they could not exclude the possibility that under 
some circumstances the spatial characteristics of saccades 
would also show effects on incongruent trials given previ-
ous work showing that increasing spatial separation between 
target and distractor stimuli leads to an increase in the effect 
of the distractor on characteristics of the saccadic response 
(Findlay, 1982; McSorley et al., 2004; Walker et al., 1997).
Bundt et al. (2018) recently reported a Stroop congruency 
effect on response execution times in a study requiring par-
ticipants to use a computer mouse to point to the target patch 
on the screen. Response targets where all in the upper half of 
the computer screen and participants guided the mouse from 
a start position in the lower half of the screen. They observed 
this effect despite not separating the target and distractor 
or enforcing a response time deadline. The configuration 
differences, the use of mouse-tracking vs. the oculomotor 
methodology and the language of the stimuli (Dutch vs. 
English), might have contributed to producing the different 
results. Unfortunately, Bundt and colleagues did not employ 
a neutral trial baseline so it is not clear whether their effect 
represents interference, facilitation, or both.
In summary, two studies have reported Stroop effects on 
response execution; findings that represent a challenge to the 
currently assumed modularity between response selection 
and execution. More work is needed to determine what con-
ditions produce Stroop effects on response execution and in 
which response modalities. Furthermore, it would be inter-
esting for future research to reveal whether semantic and 
task conflict are registered at this very late stage of selec-
tion. For now, this work suggests that even if selection only 
occurred at the level of response output and not before, it is 
not always entirely successful, even if the eventual response 
is correct.
Locus or loci of selection?
In many early considerations of the Stroop effect, a putative 
explanation was that interference would not occur unless a 
name has been generated for the irrelevant dimension; and 
interference was a form of response conflict due to there 
being a single response channel (Morton, 1969). Since word 
reading would more quickly produce a name than color nam-
ing it was thought that the word name would be sat in the 
response buffer before the color name arrived and, thus, 
would have to be expunged before the correct name could 
be produced. Thus, Stroop interference was thought to be 
a consequence of the time it took to process each of the 
dimensions.
Treisman (1969) questioned why selective attention did 
not gate the irrelevant word. Treisman concluded that the 
task of focusing on one dimension whilst excluding the other 
was impossible, especially when the dimensions are pre-
sented simultaneously. Parallel processing of both dimen-
sions would, therefore, occur and thus, response competition 
could be conceived of as the failure of selective attention to 
fully focus on the color dimension and gate the input from 
word processing. Bringing Treisman (1969) and Morton’s 
(1969) positions together, Dyer (1973) proposed interference 
results from both a failure in selective attention and a bottle-
neck at the level of response (at which the word information 
arrives more quickly). However, the speed-of-processing 
account has been shown to be unsupported (Glaser & Gla-
ser, 1982; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988), leaving the failure 
of attentional selection as the main mechanism leading to 
Stroop interference.
Whilst it is clear that participants must select a single 
response in the Stroop task and, thus, that selection occurs 
at response output, conflict stems from incompatibility 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus features 
(Egner et al., 2007), and is, thus, stimulus-based conflict. 
However, even if stimulus incompatibility does make an 
independent contribution to Stroop interference it might not 
have an independent selection mechanism; all interference 
produced at all levels might accumulate and be resolved only 
later when a single response has to be selected. One way to 
investigate whether selection occurs at any level other than 
response output would be to show successful resolution of 
conflict in the complete absence of response conflict. The 
2:1 color-response mapping paradigm is the closest method 
so far construed that would permit this but as we have 
explained it is problematic and moreover, it only addresses 
the distinction between semantic and response conflict.
There are now accounts of the Stroop task which argue 
that selection occurs both at early and late stages of process-
ing (Altmann & Davidson, 2001; Kornblum & Lee, 1995; 
Kornblum et al., 1990; Phaf et al., 1990; Sharma & McK-
enna, 1998; Zhang & Kornblum, 1998; Zhang et al., 1999). 
For example, in Kornblum and colleagues’ models selection 
occurs for both SS-conflict and SR-conflict, independently. 
We have provided evidence for multiple levels of process-
ing contributing to Stroop interference—both stimulus- and 
response-based contributions. At the level of the stimulus, 
we have argued that there is good evidence for task conflict. 
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At the level of response, we have argued that the current 
methods used to dissociate forms of informational conflict 
including phonological, semantic (stimulus) and response 
conflict do not permit us to conclude in favor of separate 
selection mechanisms for each. Moreover, we have discussed 
evidence that selection at the level of response output is not 
entirely successful given that response execution effects have 
been reported.
Another approach would be to show that the different 
forms of conflict are independently affected by experi-
mental manipulations. Above we alluded to Augustinova 
and colleagues research showing that semantic conflict is 
often reported to be preserved in contexts where response 
conflict is reduced (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012). 
However, we discussed the potential limitations of this 
approach. Taking another example, in an investigation of 
the response set effect and non-response set effect, Hasshim 
and Parris (2018) reported within-subjects experiments in 
which the trial types (e.g., response set, non-response set, 
non-color-word neutral) were presented either in separate 
blocks (pure) or in blocks containing all trial types in a 
random order (mixed). They observed a decrease in RTs 
to response set trials when trials were presented in mixed 
blocks when compared to the RTs to response set trials in 
pure blocks. These findings demonstrate that presentation 
format modulates the magnitude of the response set effect, 
substantially reducing it when trials are presented in mixed 
blocks. Importantly for present purposes, the non-response 
set effect was not affected by the manipulation suggesting 
that the response set and non-response set effects are driven 
by independent mechanisms. However, Hasshim and Par-
ris’s effect could also be a consequence of the limited effect 
of presentation format and simply be showing that some 
conflict is left over—and we do not know which type of 
conflict it is because the measure was not good enough (see 
also Hershman et al., 2020; Hershman & Henik, 2019, 2020, 
showing that conflict can be present but not expressed in the 
RT data). Future research could further investigate the effect 
of mixing trial types in blocks on the expression of types of 
conflict and facilitation in both within- and between-subjects 
designs.
Kinoshita et al. (2018) argued that semantic Stroop inter-
ference can be endogenously controlled evincing independ-
ent selection. The authors reported that a high proportion 
(75%) of non-readable neutral trials (#s) magnified semantic 
conflict (in the same way this manipulation increases task 
conflict). This means that a low proportion of non-readable 
neutral trials leads to reduced semantic conflict. However, 
since their manipulation was based on the number of non-
readable stimuli, Kinoshita et al. (2018) would have also 
increased task conflict. Neatly, their non-color-related 
neutral word baseline condition permitted them to show 
that the semantic component of informational conflict was 
modulated. Uniquely, in their study they employed both 
semantic-associative and non-response set trials to measure 
semantic conflict, perhaps providing converging evidence for 
a modification of semantic conflict. Problematically, how-
ever, they did not include a measure of response conflict in 
their study so it is not known whether purported indices of 
response conflict are also affected along with the indices of 
semantic conflict and thus, their results do not unambigu-
ously represent a modification of semantic conflict. Their 
study does, however, provide evidence that as task conflict 
increases, so inevitably does informational conflict because 
task conflict is an indication that the word is being processed 
(assuming a sufficient reading age; see Ferrand et al., 2020).
It is our contention that despite attempts to show inde-
pendence of control of semantic and response conflict, the 
published evidence so far does not permit a clear conclusion 
on the matter because the measures themselves are problem-
atic. Future research could combine the semantic distance 
manipulation (Klopfer, 1996) with a corollary for responses 
(see, e.g., Chen & Proctor, 2014; Wühr & Heuer, 2018). For 
example, an effect of the physical (e.g., red in blue, where 
red is next to blue on a response box vs. red in green when 
green is further away from the red response key) and con-
ceptual (e.g., red in blue, where the red response is indicated 
by the key labeled ‘5’ and the blue by a key labeled ‘6’) 
distance of the response keys has been reported whereby 
the closer physically or conceptually the response keys, 
the greater the amount of interference experienced (Chen 
& Proctor, 2014). Controlling for semantic distance whilst 
manipulating response distance and vice versa might give 
an insight into the contributions of semantic and response 
conflict to Stroop interference by allowing the independent 
manipulation of both.
In our opinion, methods addressing task conflict, particu-
larly those demonstrating negative facilitation and its con-
trol, are evidence for a form of conflict that is independent 
from response conflict. The evidence for an earlier locus 
(Hershman & Henik, 2019), distinct developmental trajec-
tory (Ferrand et al., 2020) and independent control (Goldfarb 
& Henik, 2007; Kalanthroff et al., 2013) support the notion 
that task conflict has a different locus and selection mecha-
nism to response conflict. Therefore, any model of Stroop 
performance that does not account for task conflict does 
not provide a full account of factors contributing to Stroop 
effects. Only one model currently accounts for task conflict 
(Kalanthroff et al., 2018) although this model employs the 
PDP connectionist architecture that falls foul of the word 




Unambiguous evidence that interference (or facilitation) is 
observed even in the absence of response competition (or 
convergence) constitutes a necessary prerequisite for mov-
ing beyond the historically favored response locus of Stroop 
effects. In our opinion, task conflict has been shown to be an 
independent locus for Stroop interference, but phonological, 
semantic and response conflict (collectively informational 
conflict) have not been shown to be independent forms of 
conflict. One could argue that models that incorporate early 
selection mechanisms are better supported by the evidence, 
at least in their ability to represent multiple levels of selec-
tion that might possibly occur, if not necessarily where that 
selection occurs since these models do not account for task 
conflict. Moreover, no extant model can currently predict 
interference that is observed to occur at the level of response 
execution and only one model seems able to account for 
differences in magnitudes of Stroop effects as a function of 
response modes (Roelofs, 2003).
In short, if the conclusions drawn here are accepted, mod-
els of Stroop task performance will have to be modified so 
they can more effectively account for multiple loci of both 
Stroop interference and facilitation. This also applies to the 
implementations of the Stroop task that are currently used 
in neuropsychological practice (e.g., Strauss et al., 2007) 
and applied in basic and applied research. As discussed by 
Ferrand and colleagues (2020), the extra sensitivity of the 
Stroop test (stemming from the ability to detect and rate 
each of these components separately) would provide clinical 
practitioners with invaluable information since the differ-
ent forms of conflict are possibly detected and resolved by 
different neural regions. In sum, this review also calls for 
changes in Stroop research practices in basic, applied and 
clinical research.
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